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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We receive them in the mail every day:  materials from credit card companies, 
ranging from applications to cards pre-printed with our names and information.  
Most of us understand these unsolicited mailings to be mere attempts to gain 
business.  But imagine that you are poor, uneducated, perhaps even mentally ill, and 
you have trouble providing for yourself and your family.  Will you understand the 
significance of a credit card and its underlying responsibility?  Should you be 
expected to?  You did not request the card and may even believe it to be a gift or a 
form of assistance.  You call the number on the back of the card to activate it and 
begin charging necessities for your family.  You may charge only a few dollars, or 
perhaps you charge thousands of dollars worth of goods and services.  Either way, 
you cannot possibly pay off the amount, so the bill continues to grow with fees and 
interest.  Over time, you owe more money in fees and interest than you ever charged.  
Should you be responsible for your charges, interest, and fees?   
Some attorneys encounter this very situation every day:  people who have very 
little money ring up thousands of dollars in credit card bills.  They may or may not 
understand the workings of a credit card, but none of them can pay the bill.  Some of 
these individuals have done this before; they are repeat offenders who are on 
payment plans or who have already had their debts discharged in bankruptcy.  Yet 
they still receive credit card applications every day, some from the same companies 
with which they have previously had credit card problems.  Is there a point where 
some of the responsibility should shift to the credit card companies?   
Yes, responsibility should shift to the credit card company through the doctrine 
of improvident extension of credit.  As defined by Vern Countryman,2 an 
improvident extension of credit is: 
[A] contractual extension of credit to a debtor where it cannot reasonably 
be expected that the debtor can repay the debt according to the terms of 
the agreement . . . in view of the circumstances of the debtor at the time 
credit was extended as these circumstances were known to the creditor or 
would have been revealed to him on reasonable inquiry prior to credit 
extension.3   
Improvident extension of credit, discussed heavily in the 1960s and 1970s, has 
resurfaced as a defense to breach of contract claims in recent years.  The defense is 
                                                                
2Vern Countryman was a professor at Harvard Law School and a specialist in commercial 
law, bankruptcy law and reform, secured transactions law, and civil liberties.  HLS’ Vern 
Countryman Dies, HARVARD UNIVERSITY GAZETTE, May 13, 1999, available at http://www. 
hno.harvard.edu/gazette/1999/05.13/Countryman.obit.html. Countryman not only defined 
improvident extension of credit, but was an advocate for its codification for decades.  
Margaret Howard, Vern Countryman and Barry Zaretsky: A Legacy of Ideas, 75 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 283, 294 (2001). Ultimately, he was unsuccessful in his attempts to introduce the concept 
into law.  Id.    Countryman has been called “a voice in the wilderness, although everything he 
said twenty and thirty years ago still has relevance today.”  Id.  
3Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 
ME. L. REV. 1, 23 (1975).  
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss3/9
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largely unsuccessful, and creditors generally prevail in cases against debtors.4  
However, in 2004, a municipal court judge in Cleveland, Ohio proved to be 
sympathetic to an impoverished debtor representing herself against a large credit 
card company.5  The judge6 did not use the term improvident extension of credit, but 
the theory resonates in the judge’s rationale.  While Vern Countryman and his 
colleagues did not discuss credit card lending in terms of improvident extension of 
credit,7 this doctrine and its underlying theories should be extended to all consumer 
credit, including credit card lending, in the form of federal statutory law or in the 
alternative, favorable court decisions for the debtor.      
This note will examine improvident extension of credit as an extension of 
unconscionability in consumer credit card lending.  Part II of this note will discuss 
the history and foundation of unconscionability.  Part III will discuss the history and 
foundation of improvident extension of credit, as well as the many failed attempts to 
create a solution to the problem of improvident extension of credit in the United 
States.  Part IV of this note will analyze the current role of improvident lending in 
consumer credit and why no solution was reached in the 1970s.  Part V will examine 
the increased need for consumer protection in the last few decades.  Part VI will 
discuss the inadequate solutions proposed to resolve the issue of improvident 
extension of credit in society.  Part VII will examine Discover Bank v. Owens,8 a 
recent case holding in favor of a debtor.  Finally, Part VIII will discuss the need to 
readdress the lack of statutory law on the subject of improvident extension of credit 
and offer several possible solutions.   
II.  UNCONSCIONABILITY 
The common law doctrine of unconscionability represents a departure from the 
traditional caveat emptor philosophy taken by the judicial system.  In 1966, Judge 
Hyman Korn of the Supreme Court of New York said that “[w]e have reached the 
point where ‘Let the buyer beware’ is a poor business philosophy for a social order 
allegedly based upon man’s respect for his fellow man.  Let the seller beware, too!  
A free enterprise system not founded upon personal morality will ultimately lose 
freedom.”9  Unconscionability has been defined and explained in many paramount 
                                                                
4See, e.g., Gill v. Nelnet Loan Servs. (In re Gill), 326 B.R. 611 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) 
(holding debtor's obligation for a loan taken out to finance daughter's college education was 
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000) because debtor did not prove she would 
be unable to maintain minimal standard of living if required to repay loan balance); Lee v. 
Bank One (In re Lee), 249 B.R. 864 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (holding debtor did not carry his 
burden of proof to avoid the lien).  
5Discover Bank, 822 N.E.2d at 871. 
6Former Cleveland Municipal Court Judge Robert J. Triozzi. 
7Countryman, supra note 3, at 17. 
8822 N.E.2d 869. 
9State v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (N.Y. Trial Term 1966);  see also Nu 
Dimension Figure Salons v. Becerra, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268, 273 (N.Y. Trial Term 1973) (“The 
term caveat emptor has been eroded by the code.  No longer can a seller hide behind it when 
acting in an unconscionable manner.”). 
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cases.  Two such cases include Toker v. Westerman10 and Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co.11 
First, in Toker, the New Jersey District Court defined an unconscionable contract 
as: 
[O]ne such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make 
on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.  
To what extent inadequacy of consideration must go to make a contract 
unconscionable is difficult to state, except in abstract terms, which gives 
but little practical help.  It has been said that there must be an inequality 
so strong, gross, and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to a 
man of common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality 
of it.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
developed its own definition of unconscionability in Williams.  The court looked to 
similar cases for guidance, including those cited in the Official Comments of § 2-302 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), discussed below, such as Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motor, Inc.13 The court set forth the common law doctrine of 
unconscionability in the District of Columbia and recognized it to include both an 
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party and contract terms that are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party.14  The court explained that the existence of 
a meaningful choice could only be determined by considering all of the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction.15  Even if a meaningful choice exists in a 
transaction, it could be negated by a gross inequity of bargaining power.16   
                                                                
10274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. Union County 1970).  In this case, a door-to-door salesman 
sold a refrigerator-freezer to the purchaser under a retail installment contract for $1,229.76.  
Id.  The purchaser made payments for a period of time but refused to pay the balance owed, 
claiming that the refrigerator was so overpriced as to make the contract unenforceable.  Id.  
The court found that the contract was unconscionable because the sale was for approximately 
two and a half times the reasonable retail value.  Id.  
11350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).  In this case, the buyers entered into installment contracts 
with the furniture company for the sale of furniture.  Id.  The buyers defaulted on their 
payments, and the district court granted judgment in favor of the company.  Id.  On appeal, the 
buyers contended that their contracts with the company were unenforceable due to 
unconscionability.  Id.  The court held that it had the authority to refuse to enforce a contract 
found to be unconscionable at the time it was made and reviewed the contract to consider the 
contract's terms in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of 
the particular trade or case.  Id.  The court determined, however, that neither the trial court nor 
the appellate court made findings on the possible unconscionability of the contracts, and thus, 
the cases were remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.  Id.  
12274 A.2d at 80.  The origin of the definition appears to be the case of Earl of 
Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (1750).  Ronald L. Hersbergen, The Improvident 
Extension of Credit as an Unconscionable Contract, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 225, 290 n.271 (1974). 
13161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
14Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.   
15Id. 
16Id.  
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Moreover, the court determined that the manner in which the contract was 
entered into is an important factor for consideration.17  The court asked whether 
“each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, [had] a 
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract,” or whether the terms 
were “hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices.”18  
The court further explained that, generally, when a party signs an agreement without 
full knowledge of its terms, the party may be held to have assumed the risk of 
entering a one-sided bargain.19  However, when a party has little bargaining power, 
and therefore little choice, and signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little 
or no knowledge of its terms, it is unlikely that the party’s consent, or even an 
objective manifestation of consent, was ever really given to all of the terms.20  In 
such a case, the general rule should be abandoned, and the court should consider 
whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that the contract should not be 
enforced.21   
Finally, when determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary consideration 
must be the terms of the contract in light of the circumstances existing when the 
contract was made.22  The court suggested that this could be achieved by examining 
the terms “in light of the general commercial background and commercial needs of a 
particular trade or case.”23  The court quoted Corbin,24 who suggested that where no 
meaningful choice is exercised upon entering the contract, the test should be whether 
the terms are “so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and 
business practices of the time and place.”25 
                                                                
17Id. 
18Id.  
19Id.  
20Id. 
21Id. at 449-50. 
22Id. at 450. 
23Id.  
24Arthur Linton Corbin (1874-1967) was a professor of contracts and other subjects at 
Yale Law School for forty years.  He authored, among other things, Corbin on Contracts, a 
classic treatise which is cited by law students and judges alike.  He also contributed as Special 
Advisor and Reporter for the chapter on remedies of the first Restatement of Contracts. 
25Williams, 350 F.2d at 450; see also Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971).  In 
Kugler, the Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed unconscionability: 
Unconscionability . . . is an amorphous concept obviously designed to establish a 
broad business ethic.  The framers of the Code naturally expected the courts to 
interpret it liberally so as to effectuate the public purpose, and to pour content into it 
on a case-by-case basis.  In that way a substantial measure of predictability will be 
achieved and professional sellers of consumer goods as well as draftsmen of contracts 
for their sale to ordinary consumers will become aware of the abuses the courts have 
declared unacceptable and will avoid them.  The intent of the clause is not to erase the 
doctrine of freedom of contract, but to make realistic the assumption of the law that 
the agreement has resulted from real bargaining between parties who had freedom of 
choice and understanding and ability to negotiate in a meaningful fashion.   
Id. at 651-52. 
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Besides being a common law defense, unconscionability is also a statutory 
defense to breach of contract claims.  Unconscionability, as codified in UCC § 2-
302, states that if the court, as a matter of law, finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or limit the application of any unconscionable clause to avoid 
an unconscionable result.26  This section “permits a court to accomplish directly what 
heretofore was often accompanied by construction of language, manipulations of 
fluid rules of contract law and determinations based upon a presumed public 
policy.”27  The basic test for unconscionability is set forth in Official Comment 1 to § 
2-302:  “whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the 
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the 
making of the contract.”28  While the Uniform Commercial Code forbids 
unconscionable clauses in contracts, it fails to define what “unconscionable” actually 
means.  Courts often look to the common law definitions from such cases as Toker 
and Williams, discussed above.   
While § 2-302 of the UCC has been used extensively by courts to police 
unconscionable agreements, it is not a consumer protection enactment.29  In order for 
the UCC to apply, the agreement must involve a transaction of goods.30  Thus, 
consumer loans, consumer leases, and the sale of consumer services or land are not 
covered by this section.31  Another doctrine began to develop that would similarly 
protect consumers but would also apply to contracts that did not involve the sale of 
goods:  the doctrine of improvident extension of credit. 
III.  THE HISTORY OF IMPROVIDENT EXTENSION OF CREDIT 
While first popular in the 1960s and ‘70s, improvident extension of credit has 
been a concern since the days of Plato.  Plato, speaking through Socrates in the 
Republic, posited that in an oligarchical state, one in which the “‘government rest[s] 
on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is 
deprived of it,’” the “greedy ‘men of business’ would acquire property [by] lending 
at extravagant rates,” and the debtors would be forced to respond in revolution.32  
                                                                
26U.C.C. § 2-302 (2005). 
27Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969). 
28U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
29Hersbergen, supra note 12, at 289. 
30Id.  
31Id. 
32Howard, supra note 2, at 295 & n.73 (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book VIII, at 
550c-550d).  Plato wrote: 
And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, 
men of good family have often been reduced to beggary? 
Yes, often. 
And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, . . . and 
they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against 
everybody else, and are eager for revolution. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss3/9
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While those writing about improvident extension of credit in the 20th century did not 
see quite as dire consequences as Plato, they shared his desire to place some of the 
responsibility on the creditors.33  Beginning in the 1930s, several attempts were made 
to codify the doctrine of improvident extension of credit, including the proposed 
Model State Collection Act, the National Bankruptcy Conference Committee, the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and the National Commission on Consumer 
Finance.  Most of these attempts stemmed from the area of bankruptcy law; however, 
none of these attempts were completely successful in capturing Countryman’s 
original concept of improvident extension of credit.34 
A.  Model State Collection Act 
One of the first proposals to codify improvident extension of credit came from 
Professor Wesley Sturges in 1934.35  Sturges authored a Model State Collection Act 
that was published in the Yale Law Journal36 but adopted nowhere.37  Sturges wrote: 
“All too frequently, stable retail credit obligations, predicated upon conservative 
credit extensions, are brought to default or bankruptcy because a subsequent credit-
grantor indulges first in high pressure salesmanship whereby the debtor is over sold 
and then in ruthless collection methods.”38  He also quoted the discussion of 
                                                           
That is true. 
On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not 
even to see those whom they have ruined, insert their sting–that is, their money–into 
some one else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many 
times over multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper 
abound in the State. 
Yes, he said, there are plenty of them–that is certain.  
The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by restricting a 
man’s use of his own property, or by another remedy: 
What other? 
One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to 
their characters: –Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary 
contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and 
the evils of which we are speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.   
Id. at 295 (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book VIII, at 555d-556b). 
33“Plato’s remedies–restricting property owners’ unbridled freedom to use their property 
and placing the risks flowing from voluntary contracts on creditors–have clear, albeit 
imperfect, parallels in bankruptcy law today.”  Id.  
34Countryman, supra note 3, at 18. 
35Id. at 7.   
36Wesley A. Sturges, A Proposed State Collection Act, 43 YALE L.J. 1055 (1934). 
37Countryman, supra note 3, at 8.  Countryman enumerated several defects with Sturges’s 
proposal.  Id.  He first noted that the act created incentives for other creditors to bring about a 
complete liquidation of the debtor’s estate when one creditor moved to collect his claim.  Id.  
Moreover, each general creditor was expected to have complete knowledge of the debtor’s 
financial position, an unreasonable expectation.  Id.  Finally, any creditor with a security 
interest would prevail over general creditors, regardless of when the secured creditor extended 
credit.  Id.  
38Wesley A. Sturges & Don E. Cooper, Credit Administration & Wage Earner 
Bankruptcies, 42 YALE L.J. 487, 524 (1933). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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overloading debtors from the Thatcher Report,39 setting forth the principle that 
creditors themselves are often to blame for the losses they incur because credit is 
extended carelessly and without adequate inquiry or with the expectation that the 
profits from the increased volume of sales will exceed the probable credit losses.40  
Regardless of the credit risk, the consequences of increasing sales by encouraging 
people of moderate and low income to make purchases on credit that they cannot 
afford are shown in the bankruptcy statistics.41  Unfortunately, the losses from 
bankruptcy are shared by all creditors equally.42  The Thatcher Report also provided 
an illustration of this principle: 
The situation is well illustrated in the case of wage earners who, in large 
numbers, seek discharge from their debts in bankruptcy because they have 
been induced by one group of creditors at the expense of another to buy 
luxuries they cannot afford.  These debtors either because of the more 
active collection methods of dealers in luxuries or in order to retain 
property sold to them under conditional sales contracts, often satisfy their 
debts owing for luxuries and seek discharge in bankruptcy from debts 
owing to the butcher, the baker, the grocer and the doctor, who had no 
part in bringing about their insolvency.43 
As part of the proposed act, unsecured contractual creditors would be entitled to 
priority payment from a debtor’s estate in the order in which they extended credit.44  
Furthermore, when one creditor brought an action to collect his claim, other creditors 
could join in the same action and assert their priorities.45  From the Model State 
Collection Act, it is apparent that a solution to the problem of improvident extension 
of credit, while not termed such, has been sought for many decades. 
B.  National Bankruptcy Conference Committee 
“In 1965, the National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC)46 created a special 
committee, [chaired by Vern Countryman,] to propose improvements in wage earner 
                                                                
39In 1929, as a consequence of a number of grand jury indictments for bankruptcy frauds, 
District Judge Thomas D. Thacher conducted an investigation of over 4000 witnesses, creating 
the “Donovan Report,” named after the counsel for the bar associations that participated in the 
investigation.  Countryman, supra note 3, at 6 n.28.  Thacher became Soliciter General of the 
United States and directed a nationwide survey by the Department of Justice to produce the 
“Thacher Report.”  Id. 
40Id. (citing STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, S. DOC. NO. 72-65 
(1st Sess. 1932)). 
41Id. at 6-7.  
42Id.  
43Id. at 7.  
44Sturges, supra note 36, at 1080. 
45Id. at 1076. 
46The National Bankruptcy Conference is a voluntary, non-profit, self-supporting 
organization of about 65 lawyers, law teachers, and bankruptcy judges who have achieved 
scholarly distinction in the field of bankruptcy law.  National Bankruptcy Conference, 
www.nationalbankruptcyconference.org/mission.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2005).  The 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss3/9
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proceedings under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.”47  The committee 
recommended a proposed bill that would have added, among other things, two new 
provisions to Chapter XIII: 
(1)  On application of the debtor and after hearing on notice to the creditor 
concerned, the court might determine that a claim, secured or unsecured, 
was unconscionable or contained unconscionable terms, and might 
disallow such claim and order it excluded from the wage earner plan, or 
allow the claim without the unconscionable terms, or so limit the claim as 
to avoid any unconscionable result. . . .48 
(2)  On application of the debtor and after hearing on notice to the creditor 
concerned, the court might determine that a claim, secured or unsecured, 
was based on “an improvident extension of credit in view of the 
information reasonably available to the creditor at the time of extending 
credit, and such claim may then be separately provided for in the plan, or 
may be excluded from the plan, and if excluded from the plan shall not be 
deemed dealt with by the plan.”49 
The NBC approved the proposal on unconscionability, but not the improvident 
credit extension provision.50 
                                                           
purpose of the Conference is to study bankruptcy laws and draft proposals for their reform.  Id.  
The organization was formed in the 1940s by leading scholars who assisted Congress in 
drafting the Chandler Act of 1938, the first comprehensive revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898.  Id.  Since its formation, the Conference has monitored the operation and practice of 
bankruptcy law and has consulted with Congress in every substantial amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Act up to the 1970s.  Id. 
47Countryman, supra note 3, at 8.  The proposed improvements were to be an alternative 
to a bill, H.R. 292, 89th Cong. (1965) (1st Sess.), sponsored by the American Bar Association 
Consumer Bankruptcy Committee, providing for compulsory Chapter XIII proceedings.  
Countryman, supra note 3, at 8.   
48Countryman, supra note 3, at 8-9.  The first proposal went on to explain: 
This proposal was modeled on § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) but 
that section is confined in its application to “transactions in goods.” While the concept 
of unconscionability did not originate with the UCC, and has been employed by courts 
to test personal service contracts and loan agreements, judicial development of the 
concept had been spotty and the intent of the proposal was to give the Chapter XIII 
court a clear statutory base for testing any claim for unconscionability regardless of 
development of state law on the subject. 
Id. at 9. 
49Id. The second proposal explained that “[t]his proposal, unlike the one dealing with 
unconscionability had no precedent in case law or statute.”  Id. 
50Id. at 9-10.  Countryman explained that the proposal on improvident credit extension 
was flawed for two reasons. Id. at 10.  First, there was no reason for confining it to Chapter 
XIII cases.  Id.  Second, it was unclear whether an improvident claim excluded from the plan 
would be covered by the bankruptcy discharge because a discharge in a Chapter XIII case 
applies only to debts provided for in the plan.  Id.  
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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C.  Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
In 1968, the American Bar Association’s National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC).51  
Section 5.108 extended the unconscionability “provisions of UCC § 2-302 to any 
consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan.”52  Similar to the UCC, the 
UCCC does not define the term unconscionable; however, it does list five factors for 
consideration.53  The first factor encompasses the idea of improvident extension of 
credit:  “‘belief by the creditor at the time consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or 
consumer loans are made that there was no reasonable probability of payment in full 
of the obligation by the debtor.’”54  The UCCC was only adopted in twelve states, 
and much of it became preempted or unnecessary by the federal Truth in Lending 
Act.55   
D.  National Commission on Consumer Finance 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the National Commission on Consumer Finance 
(NCCF) conducted an inquiry into the concept of improvident extension of credit.56  
Vern Countryman was questioned by the Commission’s counsel and provided them 
with a general standard.57  He felt that when a bankruptcy court considers whether a 
consumer credit transaction is unconscionable, in addition to the law, it should 
consider whether the transaction entailed an improvident extension of credit.58  The 
court should determine whether the creditor made an extension of credit to a debtor 
where it cannot reasonably be expected that the debtor can repay the debt in full, in 
view of the circumstances of the debtor as known to the creditor and of such 
circumstances as would have been revealed to him upon reasonable inquiry prior to 
the credit extension.59  The Commission adopted Countryman’s standard test but 
submitted no proposed legislation.60  Instead, the Commission endorsed the idea, 
                                                                
51Id. at 10.  
52Id. 
53Id. 
54Id. (quoting UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 6.111(3)(a) (1969 Revised Final 
Draft)).  Similar to the UCCC, The National Consumer Act of 1970, drafted by the National 
Consumer Law Center, provides for nonenforcement of unconscionable consumer credit 
transactions and contains a longer list of factors to be taken into consideration.  Id. at 11.  
However, the National Consumer Act never addresses improvident extension of credit.  Id.  
55Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 83, 115 (1999). 
56Countryman, supra note 3, at 12. 
57Id.  
58Id. at 13. 
59Id. at 13-14. 
60Id. at 13. 
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previously seen in the UCCC, that improvident extension of credit should be treated 
as a piece of unconscionability.61 
E.  Vern Countryman’s Proposal 
Vern Countryman recognized that it takes two offending parties to complete an 
improvident transaction.62  However, he believed that creditors are in a better 
position to avoid and distribute the risk of loss of improvidence due to education, 
experience, resources, and the nature of their role.63  To place the risk of loss on the 
improvident creditor, a remedy must be conferred on the improvident debtor.64  
Countryman posited that improvident extension of credit should be available to 
debtors to be used as both a defense and as a basis for affirmative relief.65 
According to Countryman, debtors should be permitted to assert improvident 
extension of credit as a defense in bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy cases.66  The 
defense should apply only to the part of the claim recognized as being improvident, 
not to the entire claim.67  When timely asserted by debtors, the defense would 
provide a remedy for not only debtors, but their other creditors as well.68 
There are some instances when relieving debtors of their obligation to repay 
improvident credit extensions will not remedy the damage done to debtors or to their 
other creditors.69  Due to the improvident debt, debtors “may have fallen into arrears 
on . . . other debts,” or may have been unable to provide for their families.70  For this 
                                                                
61Id. Countryman also prepared and submitted a paper to the Commission on the 
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.  Id. at 14.  The paper addressed both improvident and 
unconscionable credit extension and suggested that both concepts should be uniformly 
incorporated in the bankruptcy law through amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.  Id.  In 1973, 
the Commission filed a report and revised the Bankruptcy Act of 1973.  Id.  Section 4-
403(b)(8) of the Act provided for the disallowance of a consumer debt that was 
unconscionable.  Id. at 15.  Section 4-403(c) set forth three factors to be considered in 
determining unconscionability.  Id.  To Countryman’s dismay, none of the factors focused on 
improvident extension of credit.  Id.  The third factor, however, incorporated nonbankruptcy 
law on the subject by authorizing the consideration of “definitions of unconscionability in 
statutes, regulations, rulings, and decisions of State and federal legislative, administrative, and 
judicial bodies.”  Id.; see also Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases, 
47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 631 (1972). 
62Countryman, supra note 3, at 17.  Countryman wrote: “[A]s with the Tango it takes two 
to be improvident–any credit extension which is improvident on the part of the creditor is 
equally improvident on the part of the debtor.”  Id. 
63Id. 
64Id. 
65Id. at 18, 20. 
66Id. at 18.  The defense must be applied to nonbankruptcy law because not all 
improvident debtors resort to bankruptcy.  Id.  Further, any defense recognized in other areas 
of the law is applicable in bankruptcy.  Id.  
67Id.  
68Id. 
69Id. at 20. 
70Id. 
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reason, Countryman believed that debtors and their other creditors should be able to 
recover, from the improvident creditor, any damages that they can prove.71   Whether 
as a defense or a basis for affirmative relief, Countryman believed strongly that 
improvident extension of credit should not remain mere common law, but must be 
recognized through legislation.72 
IV.  THE CURRENT STATE OF IMPROVIDENT EXTENSION OF CREDIT 
Vern Countryman was never able to see improvident extension of credit codified 
during his lifetime.73  To date, the UCCC is the most successful codification that has 
been achieved in the area of improvident extension of credit.74   The proposals for 
codification slowed after the 1970s, and no solution was ever reached, although 
many scholars still shared Countryman’s concerns.75  However, in the 1980s, the 
financial services market began to change with the securitization of loans76 and the 
repeal of usury laws,77 and improvident extension of credit lessened as a concern.  
A.  Market Securitization  
Securitization changed the financial services market because it allowed more 
capital to be generated while reducing risks and costs through diversification.78  
Securitization of both government sponsored entities and the private sector began in 
the 1980s.79  Securitization is a multi-step process used to convert packages of loans 
into securities that are backed by collateral.80  First, lenders make loans to 
borrowers.81  The loans are then bundled and transferred to a special-purpose vehicle 
                                                                
71Id.  
72Id. at 21.  
73Countryman died at the age of 81 on May 2, 1999.  HLS’ Vern Countryman Dies,  supra 
note 2. 
74Howard, supra note 2, at 297. 
75Elizabeth Warren, Countryman’s successor at Harvard Law School, and coauthors 
Teresa Sullivan and Jay Westbrook have written two books that address improvident extension 
of credit indirectly by describing the role that lenders play in the bankruptcies of their debtors.  
In the first book, the authors posit that creditors could reduce bankruptcy losses by gathering 
more complete information about prospective borrowers.  TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:  BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989).  The 
second book, which focuses on credit card issuers, discusses how lending practices help create 
the financial jeopardy that leads to bankruptcy.  TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE 
MIDDLE CLASS:  AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000). 
76Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1273 (2002). 
77Jorge Amador, Are Credit Interest Rates Too High?, THE FREEMAN (Jan. 1988), 
available at www.libertyhaven.com/theoreticalorphilosophicalissues/economics/financial 
markets/creditcard.html. 
78Engel, supra note 76, at 1274. 
79Id. at 1273. 
80Id. at 1274.  
81Id.  
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that reduces the risk of default associated with the loans by adding credit 
enhancements.82  The special-purpose vehicle creates, issues, and then sells the 
securities to investors.83 The special-purpose vehicle may collect loan payments and 
distribute the proceeds, or the seller of the loan may retain these rights.84  
Securitization eliminates the liquidity restraints suffered by banks and lenders and 
also allows more funds to be available to lend by creating a constant flow of money 
into the market.85  Moreover, securitization allows more entities to join the financial 
services market.  With securitization, lenders do not have to be large, highly 
capitalized financial institutions.86   
B.  The Repeal of Usury Laws and the Impact of Marquette National Bank of 
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.87  
1.  The History of the Credit Card Industry 
To analyze the effect of the repeal of usury laws on improvident extension of 
credit, it is helpful to examine the history of the credit card industry.  Charge cards, 
the predecessors to the modern credit card, were established by Western Union and 
various department stores, hotels, and oil companies around 1914.88  Early charge 
cards could be used to purchase the issuers’ goods and services only, and balances 
had to be paid monthly.89  The first general purpose card was introduced in 1950 by 
Diners Club and allowed customers to use the card at a variety of establishments.90  
In 1958, American Express issued a similar card.91  The transformation from charge 
card to credit card occurred when banks entered the industry, issuing general purpose 
credit cards that allowed balances to be carried from month to month unlike the 
charge card.92  
Bank of America issued the nation’s first general purpose credit card in 1958 
when it mass-mailed sixty thousand credit cards to the residents of Fresno, 
California.93  The bank hoped to attract customers with a new revolving credit line 
                                                                
82Id.  
83Id. 
84Id. 
85Id.  
86Id.  
87439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
88David A. Lander, “It ‘is’ the Best of Times, It ‘is’ the Worst of Times”: A Short Essay on 
Consumer Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 204 (2004). 
89Id.  
90Id. 
91Id. 
92Id.  
93Frontline: The Secret History of the Credit Card (PBS television broadcast Nov. 23, 
2004), available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit [hereinafter PBS Show].  
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
448 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:435 
and to tap into the “pent-up consumer demands of World War II baby boomers.”94  
Many banks followed the example of Bank of America and began soliciting the 
masses with open-ended lines of credit.95  However, the concept of far-off banks 
extending unlimited credit did not catch on immediately.96  In fact,  growth in the 
industry stalled for over a decade because most merchants only accepted credit cards 
issued by local banks.97   
Again showing its innovation in the industry, Bank of America introduced the 
modern credit card in 1966 when it began licensing the BankAmericard credit card 
logo to other banks, providing the infrastructure for a national system to process 
credit card transactions.98  The group of participating banks is known today as Visa.99  
Another similar group of banks formed the MasterCard association.100  While Visa 
and MasterCard were able to convince merchants nationwide to accept their cards, 
problems for the credit card industry were just beginning.101 
The next stumbling block for the industry came just before Christmas in 1966 
and was termed “The Chicago Debacle.”102  A group of Midwestern banks mass-
mailed five million credit cards to reach the market of Chicago holiday shoppers.103  
Cards were mailed to convicted felons, children, and even family pets.104  There was 
an uproar among consumers, and the nightly news reported incidents of corrupt 
postal workers stealing cards for organized crime rings.105  Consumers were being 
billed for thousands of dollars of charges on credit cards that they had never 
received.106  Congress held hearings after some consumers called for credit cards to 
be banned completely.107  Eventually, the waters calmed for the surviving issuing 
banks, but not for long.   
Another problem for the credit card industry came in the form of state usury 
laws.  Originally developed in the colonial period, states established usury laws to 
                                                                
94Id. “‘What is this with people wanting credit?’ ” Walter Wriston, the chairman of 
Citibank, recalled being asked by his boss.  Id.  “And I said, ‘Look, we just put five years of 
our life in a brown suit carrying an M1 riffle, and we want the refrigerator now.’”  Id. 
95Id. 
96Id. Wriston explained in an interview that his hometown of 30,000 people had one bank, 
and “the old guy with a green eyeshade gave you credit or he didn’t.”  Id.  
97Lander, supra note 88, at 204.  
98Id. 
99Id.  
100Id.  
101Id.  
102PBS Show, supra note 93. 
103Id.  
104Id. 
105Id.  
106Id. 
107Id. 
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cap interest rates.108  In the 1970s, inflation rates were high, and credit card 
companies were being squeezed between the interest rates that they could charge 
under the state usury laws and the high interest rates that they had to pay due to 
inflation.109  Companies were lending money at rates much lower than they were 
paying out.110 
2.  Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp. 
In 1978, a solution came for credit card companies in the form of a Supreme 
Court opinion; the Court changed the interpretation of usury laws in Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.111  In this case, the 
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis (“Marquette”), a Minnesota-chartered 
national banking association enrolled in the BankAmericard plan, brought an action 
to enjoin the operation of the First National Bank of Omaha (“Omaha”), a Nebraska-
chartered national banking association also enrolled in the BankAmericard plan, until 
Omaha complied with the Minnesota usury laws.112  Omaha solicited customers in 
Minnesota, among other states, and charged cardholders the interest rate mandated 
by Nebraska usury laws, a higher interest rate than permitted by Minnesota usury 
laws.113  Marquette claimed to be losing customers to Omaha due to the low interest 
rate that they were forced to follow.114  The Solicitor General of Minnesota joined the 
lawsuit, arguing that the exportation of Nebraska’s interest rate would make it 
difficult for states to enact effective usury laws.115   
The Supreme Court held that § 85 of the National Bank Act of 1864116 allowed 
Omaha to charge its Minnesota customers a higher interest rate than that sanctioned 
                                                                
108Amador, supra note 77.  States had the power to establish their own usury rates so they 
often varied from state to state.  Id.  In the 1950s, one state had a rate of 4%, five states had a 
rate of 5%, forty states had a rate of 6%, and four states had a rate of 7%.  Id. (quoting SIDNEY 
HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 401 (1977)). 
109PBS Show, supra note 93.   
110Id.  Walter Wriston from Citibank explained that “[y]ou are lending money at 12% and 
paying 20%.  Id.  You don’t have to be Einstein to realize you’re out of business.”  Id.  
111439 U.S. at 299. 
112Id. at 301. 
113Id. at 302.  Nebraska law permited Omaha to charge an interest rate of 18% per year on 
the first $999.99 and 12% per year on amounts of $1,000 and more.  Id.  Minnesota law fixed 
the permitted annual interest rate at 12%.  Id.  
114Id. at 304.   
115Id. at 316, 318-19. 
11612 USC § 85 (2000).  Section 85 of the Act, titled “Rate of interest on loans, discounts 
and purchases,” states: 
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, 
or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate 
allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at 
a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper 
in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is 
located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of 
any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
450 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:435 
by Minnesota law.117  The Court reasoned that Omaha could not be deprived of its 
Nebraska location merely because the BankAmericard program extended credit to 
residents of other states; Nebraska was the state from which credit was extended, 
unpaid balance finance charges were assessed, payments were received, and credit 
cards were issued.118  Further, the statutory location of the bank did not change just 
because the credit cards could be used to purchase goods and services outside of 
Nebraska.119  However, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General of Minnesota that 
the exportation of interest rates may impair the ability of states to maintain effective 
usury laws but indicated that this problem was always a part of the National Bank 
Act and that any correction should be achieved legislatively.120 
The Marquette decision applied to all types of consumer loans but had its greatest 
impact on the credit card industry.121  Due to the ability of credit card lending to be 
accomplished completely by mail, credit card companies could move their 
headquarters to the states with the most liberal usury laws.122  Citibank was the first 
bank to seize the opportunity presented by the Marquette decision.123  By 1980, 
Citibank, incorporated in New York, had lost more than one billion dollars because 
the inflation rate exceeded the amount of interest that the company could charge its 
credit card customers under the New York usury laws.124  Walter Wriston, the 
                                                           
limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under 
this title. When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State, or Territory, or District, the 
bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding 7 per centum, or 1 per 
centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the 
Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located, 
whichever may be the greater, and such interest may be taken in advance, reckoning 
the days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt has to run. The maximum 
amount of interest or discount to be charged at a branch of an association located 
outside of the States of the United States and the District of Columbia shall be at the 
rate allowed by the laws of the county, territory, dependency, province, dominion, 
insular possession, or other political subdivision where the branch is located. And the 
purchase, discount, or sale of a bona fide bill of exchange, payable at another place 
than the place of such purchase, discount, or sale, at not more than the current rate of 
exchange for sight-drafts in addition to the interest, shall not be considered as taking 
or receiving a greater rate of interest.   
Id.  
117Marquette, 439 U.S. at 307-19.  The District Court entered partial summary judgment 
for Marquette, holding that the Minnesota usury law was not preempted by § 85 of the 
National Bank Act.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, holding that Nebraska 
usury laws governed the operation of the Nebraska national bank’s credit card program. Id.  
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota. 
Id. at 306.  
118Id. at 310-12. 
119Id. at 312-13. 
120Id. at 318-19.   
121Lander, supra note 88, at 214. 
122Id.  
123PBS Show, supra note 93. 
124Id. 
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chairman of Citibank, attempted to convince New York legislators to raise the usury 
rates or to eliminate them all together, but the legislators refused.125  At the same 
time, South Dakota was considering eliminating its usury laws in an attempt to 
stimulate the local economy.126  Wriston contacted Bill Janklow, the governor of 
South Dakota, to make a deal.127  He proposed that if South Dakota would quickly 
pass legislation that would enable Citibank to move its credit card operations to the 
state, the bank would bring four hundred high-paying, white-collar jobs.128  Other 
banks began to follow the lead of Citibank and move to South Dakota.129  Other 
states caught on as well; Delaware passed similar legislation the following year, and 
many other states loosened their usury laws.130   
During the years prior to the Marquette decision when credit card companies 
were losing billions of dollars, some consumers also paid the price for state usury 
laws.131  Eligibility standards for new applicants became more stringent, and some 
banks refused new accounts altogether.132  Moreover, millions of delinquent accounts 
were discontinued.133  Once states began to change interest rates, profits soared for 
the credit card industry, and consumers could easily obtain credit cards.134  Between 
1980 and 1990, the number of credit cards more than doubled, and the average 
household credit card balance rose from $518 to $2,700.135  With their new profits 
and power, credit card companies were given more freedom while consumer 
protections, such as improvident extension of credit, began to relax.136 
                                                                
125Id.  In an interview, Wriston said that he told New York’s political leaders that they 
only had to raise the usury ceiling a reasonable amount, and Citibank would stay in the state.  
Id.  Legislators did not believe that the company would actually relocate, so they did not 
reconsider the interest rates.  Id.  
126Id.  Bill Janklow, the former governor of South Dakota, said that “[the state] was in the 
poor house.  It cost 42 cents to a bushel in 1980 to haul wheat.  Id.  When something’s only 
selling for $2.20 a bushel, you certainly can’t afford to be paying almost 50 cents a bushel to 
ship it.”  Id.  
127Id.  
128Id.  Wriston also agreed that Citibank would be a limited bank, as not to create 
competition for existing local banks.  Id.  Wriston told Janklow, “We’ll put the facility in an 
inconvenient place for customers and we’ll pay different interest rates.  All we want to do is 
use it to issue cards.”  Id.  As for the legislation, it was actually drafted by Citibank, and it was 
introduced and passed by the legislature in one day.  Id.  
129Id.  Ultimately, 3000 new high-paying jobs were brought to South Dakota.  Id.  
130Id.  
131Amador, supra note 77.   
132Id. 
133Id. 
134PBS Show, supra note 93. 
135Id.  
136Id.  
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V.  A GREATER NEED FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 
A.  New Tools for the Industry 
1.  Annual Fees 
Following the explosion of credit cards after the elimination of state usury laws, 
the credit card industry continued to evolve and began to find new ways to take 
advantage of consumers.  In 1980, the annual fee was introduced without much 
protest from cardholders.137  President Carter attempted to slow inflation by imposing 
a freeze on soliciting new credit card accounts.138  The freeze only lasted a few 
months, but it was long enough to introduce the twenty dollar annual fee to 
counteract  “transactors,” the unprofitable customers who paid off their balances 
each month.139  The annual fee allowed these customers to be profitable as well.140  
For ten years, the industry profited from the annual fee, but AT&T began offering a 
credit card with no annual fee in 1990.141   The response from consumers was 
enormous, and some competitors also eliminated their annual fees.142  But the days of 
the straight forward interest rates and mass-marketed credit cards were numbered.143 
2.  Complex Contract Terms 
Credit cards became complex financial arrangements for customers.144  The terms 
and rates were often changed by the credit card companies and were too complex to 
be understood by the cardholders.145  Like the addition of annual fees, the change 
followed an action by the President of the United States.146  On November 12, 1991, 
President George Bush announced that the economy and consumer confidence could 
be stimulated by lowering credit card rates.147  The Senate introduced a national cap 
                                                                
137Id.  
138Id.  
139Id.  
140Id. 
141Id.  
142Id.  AT&T received 260,000 phone calls from interested consumers on the first day that 
the no annual fee credit card was introduced.  Id.  
143Id.  
144Id.  
145Id.  
146Id. 
147Id.  The announcement occurred at a $1,000-a-plate fundraising luncheon for President 
Bush in New York.  Id.  An aide made a last minute addition to the President’s speech.  Id.  
The President announced, “I’d frankly like to see credit cards [sic] rates down.  I believe that 
would help stimulate the consumer and get consumer confidence moving again.”  Id.  With 
two sentences, credit cards were forever changed.  Id.  
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to credit card interest rates equaling 14% the very next day.148  After only thirty 
minutes of debate, the Senate approved the bill by a vote of 74-19.149  By the week’s 
end, the credit card industry was in a panic, and the stock market plunged.150  The 
concept of a national credit card rate cap died out, but the industry refers to the 
incident as “the Big Scare.”151  Following “the Big Scare,” the credit card industry 
decided that it was time to reevaluate its pricing practices.152 
3.  Higher Credit Lines and Penalty Fees 
The industry began searching for more profitable pricing methods, and Andrew 
S. Kahr153 was one of the first in the industry to discover that it was possible to 
analyze customer financial data with complex formulas and scoring systems to 
predict which customers were profitable “revolvers,” those least likely to pay off 
their credit card balances each month.154  Kahr also determined that higher credit 
lines were both attractive to customers and highly profitable for credit card 
companies.155  Companies could raise credit lines by decreasing the required 
minimum payment.156  Heightened credit lines increased profits for credit card 
companies in two ways.157  First, each dollar of principal would generate more 
interest because it would take longer to pay off balances.158  Second, the principal 
itself would increase because cardholders could take on more debt and make the 
same minimum monthly payments.159  Critics say that the lower minimum payment 
percentage shrouds the true cost of debt and keeps consumers dangerously 
leveraged.160  In addition, the credit card companies implemented penalty fees to 
                                                                
148Id.  The following day, after the President’s speech, Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato 
introduced the bill.  Id.  The Senator, representing the state of New York, had attended the 
luncheon.  Id.   
149Id.  
150Id. 
151Id.  
152Id. 
153Id.  Kahr was a child prodigy who earned a Ph.D. in mathematics from MIT when he 
was twenty years old.  Id.  He became a financial industry consultant and founded a credit card 
company in 1984 that would become Providian, one of the top ten credit card issuers.  Id. 
154Id.   
155Id.  
156Id.  For example, if minimum payments were cut from 5% to 2%, a company could 
increase a credit line from $2,000 to $5,000 and still charge the same $100 minimum payment.  
Id.  Today, 2% is the standard minimum payment and the average household credit card debt 
has tripled since 1990.  Id.  
157Id.  
158Id. 
159Id.  
160Id.  
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raise profits.  Penalty fees raise billions of dollars in revenue each year.161  Because 
most consumers do not anticipate that they will make late payments, they fail to shop 
around for better late fees.162  However, most consumers are late at one point or 
another.163 
B.  The Legality of Penalty Fees and Smiley v. Citibank164 
As with interest rates in the Marquette case, the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of penalty fees in Smiley v. Citibank. 165  Like Marquette, the Smiley decision 
rested on the interpretation of § 85 of the National Bank Act.166  Barbara Smiley, a 
resident of California and Citibank cardholder, brought a class-action suit against 
Citibank, a South Dakota corporation, on behalf of herself and other California 
cardholders.167  Smiley alleged that the penalty fees168 permitted under South Dakota 
law violated statutory and common law of California.169  Relying on the Marquette 
decision, the Supreme Court held that § 85 of the National Bank Act permitted a 
national bank to charge its loan customers interest at the rate allowed by the laws of 
the state in which the bank is located.170   
Smiley also challenged the definition of interest.171  The Court deferred to the 
definition provided by the Comptroller of the Currency.172  The Comptroller said that 
                                                                
161Id.  
162Id. 
163Id.  The average prime consumer incurs one late fee a year.  Id.  The average sub-prime 
consumer incurs two and a half late fees per year.  Id.  
164517 U.S. 735 (1996). 
165Id.  
166Id. at 737. 
167Id. at 738. 
168Id.  Petitioner held two credit cards from Citibank, a Classic Card and a Preferred Card.  
Id.  The Classic Card agreement allowed Citibank to charge a late fee of $15 for each monthly 
period in which the cardholder failed to make the minimum monthly payment within twenty-
five days of the due date.  Id.  The Preferred Card agreement permitted Citibank to charge a 
late fee of $6 if the minimum payment was not received within fifteen days of the due date and 
an additional fee of $15 or 0.65% of the outstanding balance, whichever is greater, if the 
minimum payment was not received by the next minimum monthly payment due date.  Id.  
169Id.  Smiley alleged the following common law violations:  breach of duty of good faith 
and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and breach 
of contract.  Id.  She alleged the following statutory claims:  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 
17200 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting unlawful business practices) and CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1671 (West 1985) (invalidating unreasonable liquidated damages).  Smiley, 517 U.S. at 738 
n.1. 
170Id. at 737. 
171Id. at 740. 
172Id.  The Court deferred to the Comptroller of the Currency because it is the practice of 
the Court to defer to reasonable judgments of agencies in regard to the meaning of ambiguous 
terms in statutes that they administer.  Id. at 739 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with 
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the term “interest,” as used in the National Bank Act, includes any payment of 
compensation to a creditor or prospective creditor for an extension of credit, any 
making available of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a borrower of a 
condition upon which credit was extended, such as numerical periodic rates, late 
fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees, over-limit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, 
and membership fees.173  However, the term does not ordinarily include appraisal 
fees, premiums, and commissions attributable to insurance guaranteeing repayment 
of any extension of credit, finders’ fees, fees for document preparation or 
notarization, or fees incurred to obtain credit reports.174  Ultimately, the Court 
validated the penalty fees charged to cardholders and decided that Citibank could 
charge penalty fees at any rate permitted by the laws of the state in which it is 
located.175 
The Smiley decision hurt consumers.  Even Duncan A. MacDonald, the former 
general counsel of Citibank’s credit card division who spearheaded the case, has 
admitted that penalty fees are out of control and that they are unfair to consumers.176  
MacDonald said that at the time of the Smiley decision, the company’s attorneys felt 
that they were working for a good cause—free-market pricing.177  Late fees were 
common and ranged from $5 to $15 before the Supreme Court decision, but after the 
decision, late fees soared to almost $40.178  MacDonald was quoted as saying, “I 
certainly didn’t imagine that someday we might’ve ended up creating 
Frankenstein.”179  Mr. Kahr, on the other hand, argues that the market will decide 
what is fair for consumers.180 
VI.  INADEQUATE SOLUTIONS 
Many people feel that solutions to the problem of improvident extension of credit 
already exist in the form of market self-regulation, educational programs, and the 
unconscionability doctrine.  However, these solutions do not adequately protect 
consumers from being exploited by improvident creditors.  
                                                           
the enforcement of banking laws.  Id.  (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity 
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995)). 
173Id. at 739-40. 
174Id. at 740. 
175Id. at 735. 
176PBS Show, supra note 93.  MacDonald said, “Millions and millions of people are being 
excessively charged late fees and bad-check fees and over-the-limit fees and then these 25% 
APRs to make profits for the industry, so that they can keep the rates lower for people who are 
rate sensitive, who can in fact, shop the system.”  Id.  
177Id. 
178Id. 
179Id. 
180Id.  Kahr said that, “[i]f someone is riskier, he should be paying a higher rate.  It’s more 
economically sound.  It’s fairer for riskier people to pay a higher interest rate, higher fees, 
whatever it is, than less risky people.”  Id.  
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A. Market Self-Regulation 
Some economists believe that the market will correct its own problems through 
market competition and lower interest rates.181  Several banks have already 
voluntarily lowered their interest rates.182  For example, American Express created 
the Optima credit card with a 13.5% interest rate.183  American Express claims that 
the market is working and “will and does respond to consumer dissatisfaction by 
reducing interest rates.”184  Financial newspapers around the country have applauded 
American Express for their actions.185  However, the Optima card is not available for 
everyone—only those consumers who already hold American Express cards can 
apply for Optima cards.186  Plus, there is an additional $15 fee on top of the $45 
annual charge.187  Applicants must also meet more stringent requirements for the 
lower rate card; the card is only offered to those viewed as safe credit risks with solid 
credit histories who have been American Express members for over a year.188  The 
new low rate credit cards have provided no protection for the low income 
cardholders who are typically the victims of improvident extension of credit.189  Nor 
have the lower rate cards created a credit card war as predicted by economists.190  
Instead, the lower rate credit cards have created a segmentation in the market.191  
Lower credit risks can borrow at lower rates, and higher risk consumers must borrow 
at higher rates, further disservicing those who need the most protection.192 
                                                                
181Amador, supra  note 77.   
182Id.  Besides American Express, Citicorp has also cut rates for preferred customers.  Id.   
Most cardholders have an interest rate of 19.8%, while preferred customers have a rate of 
16.8%.  Id.  Similarly, Wells Fargo decreased rates from 20% to 17% for customers who had a 
Wells Fargo card for at least five years.  Id.  
183Id.  
184Id.  
185Id.  The Wall Street Journal stated that “[t]he greater consumer sensitivity to interest 
rates no doubt figured into Amex’s plans to take a plunge into the business with a lower-rate 
card . . . .  Credit card interest almost certainly will come down.  It will come down without 
rate ceilings.  Nothing does it like competition.’”  Id. (quoting Editorial, Pressure on Plastic, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1987, at 22.).  This has been termed the Credit Card War.  Id.     
186Id.  
187Id. 
188Id.  
189Id.  
190Id.  
191Id.  Fortune predicted that the market would see “small interest rate reductions on 
premium cards—those offering larger credit lines and requiring better credit histories.”  Id.  
192Id.  
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B. Credit Counseling and Educational Programs 
Credit counseling and financial education programs are also suggested solutions 
to the problem of improvident extension of credit.193  These programs have been 
around for thirty years and have “helped” millions of people.194  The programs 
purport to teach consumers to save money and to create a reserve for emergencies.195  
However, the success of these programs is questionable at best.196  Low quality 
providers impose excessive charges and provide poor services.197  Higher quality 
organizations do provide an education on finances and credit.198  It is easy to teach 
someone that saving is important; however, it is difficult, if not impossible, for 
consumers with little disposable income to save money when they can barely provide 
for their families.  Moreover, the success of these programs is often measured by the 
number of people not filing a bankruptcy petition within a specified period of time 
after a counseling session.199  To measure the value of these programs, the success 
must be evaluated over a long-term period of time or by another method of 
assessment.200   
C.  Unconscionability  
Unconscionability, while possibly encompassing the idea of improvident 
extension of credit, is also an inadequate solution.  To become an adequate solution, 
courts must extend unconscionability a step further to improvident extension of 
credit.  Because unconscionability has no formal definition, courts apply this 
doctrine in different ways.  As previously discussed in Part II, many courts look at 
the bargaining position of the parties and an absence of meaningful choice.201  
Improvident credit agreements may satisfy this definition, but unconscionability does 
not take into consideration the knowledge of the debtors’ financial position and their 
inability to pay.  As developed for consumer protection, unconscionability is difficult 
and costly to invoke because it requires a lawyer’s expertise and, therefore, is not 
readily available to consumers.  Furthermore, statutory unconscionability as defined 
by the UCC only applies to transactions of goods; thus, credit card transactions lie 
outside of its scope.202  
                                                                
193Lander, supra note 88, at 211. 
194Id.   
195Id. at 212. 
196Id.  
197Id. at 217. 
198Id. at 211. 
199Id. at 212. 
200Id. 
201See, e.g., Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. Union County 1970); 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).  
202U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004). 
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VII.  A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION:  DISCOVER BANK V. OWENS 
In 2003, one municipal court judge stood up for an impoverished woman against 
a giant in the credit card industry.203   
A.  Facts 
Ruth M. Owens was one of several thousand Clevelanders each year who become 
the subjects of credit card collection suits as a result of ballooning credit card debt.204  
Debtors cite many reasons for being overwhelmed by the accumulated credit card 
debt:  disability, declining real wages, job displacement, and rising health care 
costs.205  Owens was no exception.206   
Discover Bank (“Discover”), a lender and issuer of credit cards, filed a breach of 
contract claim against Owens, a Discover Card holder, for failure to make the 
minimum monthly payments required under the cardholder agreement.207  Discover 
claimed that Owens owed a balance of $5,564.28.208  In response to the plaintiff’s 
complaint, Owens filed a handwritten answer on her own behalf, stating: 
I would like to inform you that I have no money to make payments.  I am 
on Social Security Disability.  After paying my monthly utilities, there is 
no money left except little food money and sometimes it isn’t enough.  If 
my situation was different I would pay.  I just don’t have it.  I’m sorry.209  
At trial, Discover provided the court with a copy of Owens’ Cardmember 
Agreement, which outlined the minimum monthly payment requirement, the periodic 
finance charges, and the various fees that were applicable, as well as a copy of 
Owens’ monthly statements from January 1996 to May 2003.210  The statements 
showed that Owens had a credit limit of $1,900 and had stopped using the card in 
March of 1997 before she exceeded her limit.211  Owens asserted that she had made 
her best effort to pay under her financial circumstances and had in fact made many 
payments, totaling $3,492, over the six years that followed.212  Due to miscellaneous 
fees and finance charges, Owens had paid $3,492 on a debt of $1,900, yet still 
carried a balance of $5,564.28.213 
                                                                
203Discover Bank v. Owens, 822 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Clev. 2004). 
204Id. at 871. 
205Id. 
206Id. 
207Id. 
208Id. 
209Id. 
210Id.  
211Id. at 872. 
212Id. 
213Id.  Along with late fees and over-limit fees, Owens was charged monthly for a 
Discover card product called CreditSafe Plus which would suspend her payments and finance 
charges without affecting her credit rating if she became unemployed, hospitalized, or 
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Judge Triozzi questioned how something like this could happen and noted that if 
Owens had stopped paying on her account in 1997, as an “unscrupulous person” may 
have done, her account would have been closed.214  Discover would have filed an 
action seven years earlier for an amount not in excess of $2,000.215  Discover may 
even have agreed to negotiate a settlement at a fraction of the amount due, as credit 
card companies often do.216  However, Owens was “not unscrupulous,” and she tried 
to repay her debt on her meager Social Security Disability income until she realized 
that “it was a debt out from under which she could never climb.”217  The court 
acknowledged the “widespread financial exploitation of the urban poor by 
overbearing credit card companies” and found in favor of Ruth Owens.218 
B.  Court’s Rationale 
The court relied on the notion of equity to decide this case.  “The function of 
equity is to supplement the law where it is insufficient, moderating the unjust results 
that would follow from the unbending application of the law.”219  The court 
determined that Owens had no remedy at law; thus, the court’s use of its equitable 
jurisdiction was both proper and necessary.220  No remedy exists at law because, as 
previously discussed, improvident extension of credit has ever been codified.   
In the opinion, Judge Triozzi discussed several doctrines in equity while 
balancing the responsibility of each party.221  Together, these doctrines closely 
resemble the theory of improvident extension of credit.222  The court first discussed 
Owens’s own responsibility for her situation; no one forced her to open the credit 
card, nor did they force her to use it.223  Moreover, she could have sought legal or 
financial counsel several years earlier to determine the best option for her.224  Instead, 
Owens decided to continue trying to pay her debt;  “[w]hile clearly placing her on 
the moral high road, that same highway unfortunately was her road to financial 
                                                           
disabled.  Id.  Judge Triozzi presumed that since Owens was already on Social Security 
Disability and was already unemployed, CreditSafe Plus only pertained to the possibility of 
Owens becoming hospitalized. Id. at 871. 
214Id. at 872. 
215Id. 
216Id. 
217Id. at 872-73. 
218Id. at 875.  
219Id. at 874.  (citing Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland, 77 N.E.751 (Ohio 1906)). 
220Id.  The Cleveland Municipal Court has the authority “to hear and determine all legal 
and equitable remedies necessary or proper for a complete determination of the rights of the 
parties.”  Id.   
221Id. at 873-74. 
222Id. at 873. 
223Id. 
224Id. 
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ruin.”225  The court stated that it is unfair for someone who “wants to do right to end 
up so worse off.”226  
Next, the court looked at the responsibility of the creditor, encompassing the 
theory of improvident extension of credit.227  Simply stated, improvident extension of 
credit is when a creditor knows that a debtor has financial problems and will be 
unable to repay the debt but extends credit nonetheless.  Much of the rationale from 
Discover Bank expresses this idea.  For example, the court said that it was “unfair for 
a creditor to extend easy credit at stiff terms to someone who clearly was in a 
difficult financial predicament.”228  Further, “Discover kept Owens’s account open 
and active long after it was painfully obvious that she was never going to be able to 
make payments at the expected level.”229  A contract may be equally unenforceable 
when a creditor leaves a debtor with little disposable income and presses a demand 
for judgment despite being aware of the debtor’s dire financial straits.230  Moreover, 
the court also cited an injured party’s duty to mitigate damages to prevent forfeiture 
of those that the party could have reasonably avoided.231   
Judge Triozzi also applied the doctrine of unjust enrichment in this case.232  Due 
to the fact that Discover failed to “even minimally pay attention to Owens’s 
circumstances, and for allowing the debt to accumulate unchecked,” the court 
determined that a favorable verdict for the plaintiff would create unjust enrichment; 
such a verdict would allow Discover to retain money that, in justice and in equity, 
belonged to Ruth Owens.233 
Finally, the court determined that the agreement between the parties was 
unconscionable as it applied to Owens.234  Using the definition of unconscionability 
espoused in Williams, the court found that there was an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of Owens and contract terms that were unreasonably favorable to 
Discover.235   
                                                                
225Id. 
226Id. 
227Id. 
228Id.  
229Id.  
230Id. (citing City Fin. Serv. v. Smith, No.97 CVF 00679, 2000 WL 288469 (Ohio Mun. 
Ct. Clev. Jan. 4, 2000)).   
231Id. (citing S&D Mech. Constrs., Inc. v. Enting Water Conditioning Sys., Inc., 593 
N.E.2d 354 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Geis v. Zylka, 650 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Clev. 
1995)). 
232Id. 
233Id. (citing Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 1938); Seward v. Mentrup, 622 
N.E.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)). 
234Id. at 874. 
235Id. 873-74 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965)). 
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The court used several general theories to arrive at what it thought was a fair 
result.  Instead, it could have used the theory of improvident extension of credit to 
arrive at the same conclusion. 
C.  City Financial Services v. Smith 
Discover Bank did not mention “improvident extension of credit,” but the court 
cited a case that did: City Financial Services v. Smith.236  In this case, Laura Smith 
took out a loan from City Financial Services (“City Financial”) in the amount of 
$3,000, plus $104.01 for single credit life insurance and $365.40 for property 
insurance, for a total of $3,619.69.237  The interest rate on the loan was 22.5%.238  
After Smith received the money, her ex-husband stole it in a fraud scheme.239  Smith 
was left holding the debt through no fault of her own.240  Her ex-husband was 
arrested and prosecuted but paid no restitution.241  Smith made one payment in the 
amount of $355 before going into default on the loan.242  City Financial filed a 
breach of contract claim against her.243 
The parties agreed on the facts of the case, but the defendant claimed that the 
entire loan transaction should be voided based on the theory of “improvident 
lending” because the plaintiff knew it was unreasonable to expect the defendant to be 
able to pay the terms of the loan given her limited disability income.244  At trial, 
evidence showed that Smith had a prior loan with City Financial and was behind on 
her payments.245  However, the plaintiff knew that the defendant had a residence that 
could secure any future payment upon which she defaulted.246  The court found that 
the contract between the parties was unconscionable and unenforceable because the 
creditor left the debtor with little disposable income and pressed for a judgment 
despite being aware of the debtor’s unfortunate financial position.247   
                                                                
236City Fin. Serv. v. Smith, No.97 CVF 00679, 2000 WL 288469, at *1 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 
Clev. Jan. 4, 2000).  
237Id.  
238Id. 
239Id.  After Laura Smith’s husband, Toby Smith, took the money, she contacted the police 
and prosecuted him for theft.  Id.  He was convicted and given a suspended sentence.  Id.  
There was no evidence that Toby Smith paid Laura Smith any restitution.  Id.  At the time of 
the fraud scheme, Toby Smith was married to another woman and was deceiving her and that 
family as well.  Id. 
240Id. 
241Id. 
242Id. 
243Id. 
244Id. at *2. 
245Id.  
246Id. 
247Id.  Facts at trial indicated that Smith received disability income in the amount of $574 
a month and had $355 in monthly expenses.  Id.  At the time she applied for the second loan, 
she also had $6700 in debt on two credit cards.  Id.  City Financial required at least 35% 
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In City Financial Services, the court recognized the term “improvident lending” 
but resolved the case on other theories.  The term was never mentioned in Discover 
Bank, possibly for the following reasons.  Improvident extension of credit is a term 
generally used by Legal Aid attorneys.  Most people in the legal community are 
unaware of this theory.  In Discover Bank, the defendant, who was impoverished and 
likely could have qualified for legal assistance, was not represented by counsel of 
any kind but instead chose to represent herself.  Therefore, the defense of 
improvident extension of credit was never raised on her behalf.  Further, while the 
court in Discover Bank cited City Financial Services, it is likely that “improvident 
lending,” as it was termed in the case, was never fully considered in determining the 
outcome of Discover Bank because it was not actually used in deciding the outcome 
of City Financial Services. 
VIII.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
The need for a solution to the problem of improvident extension of credit is 
clear.248  Judge Triozzi is not the only person who has taken notice of this growing 
problem.  Consumer advocates and politicians alike have expressed similar concerns.  
At a Congressional hearing on the issue of credit card debt, consumer advocate Elgie 
Holstein of the Bancard Holders of America explained that there is an economic 
level below which consumers should not be extended credit because it not only 
hinders the consumer, but the credit card company as well.249  Holstein placed much 
of the blame on the large interstate banks and institutions that mass-market credit 
cards.250  In comparing loss rates, Holstein stated that the banks that mass-market 
credit cards indiscriminately experience the highest rates of loss.251  
Senator Jim Sasser agreed with Holstein that not all consumers should be 
advanced credit, only those who are creditworthy.252  Sasser expressed the view that, 
under the current system, those cardholders who timely pay their bills also suffer.253  
People who pay their bills also pay the bills of those who do not in the form of 
higher interest rates.254  In Sasser’s opinion, if credit was only advanced to those who 
                                                           
disposable income in order to qualify for a loan.  Id.  Smith had a disposable income of only 
21%.  Id.  However, City Financial calculated her disposable income to be 36%, 1% higher 
than that required to secure a loan, by stating her income to be $718 a month.  Id.  
248Statistics show that nearly 40 million people a year are in enough financial trouble due 
to credit card debt to take drastic action.  Jeanette Joy Fisher, Some Startling Statistics About 
American Consumers (December 27, 2005), www.ezinearticles.com/?Some-Startling-
Statistics-about-American-Consumers&id=118883.  Almost 1.5 million people in the United 
States are forced to file for bankruptcy every year, and the same amount will turn to credit 
counseling services in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy.  Id.  The remaining 37 million debtors 
will attempt to work out payment plans on their own with their creditors.  Id. 
249Amador, supra note 77. 
250Id.  
251Id. 
252Id. 
253Id. 
254Id. 
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are creditworthy, rates would be substantially lower, and the banks that advance 
credit could still make a reasonable profit.255  
Judges in the legal system need to take notice of the opinions in both Discover 
Bank and City Financial Services.  Courts must revive the theory of improvident 
extension of credit that was promoted in the past by scholars such as Vern 
Countryman.  Consumers, especially low-income, poorly educated consumers, need 
to be protected from corporate giants who see cardholders as penalty fees and 
interest rates instead of the individuals they are—individuals struggling with 
financial difficulties.  When verdicts come down in favor of the cardholders, the 
consumers will gain power in the contractual relationship, and the credit card 
companies will lose some of their power.  The playing field will level off, and the 
pendulum of power will swing back toward the consumer.   
However, common law may not be the strongest solution.  Congress should 
codify improvident extension of credit to fully protect the consumer by passing a 
federal law under its commerce power to clearly define improvident extension of 
credit and establish the proper penalties.  Congress has a substantial interest in 
uniform laws because improvident extension of credit exists in every state.   A 
federal law may be preferred to a common law solution for several reasons.  First, as 
of the time of this writing, no case of precedential value exists that rules in favor of 
the consumer victim of improvident extension of credit.  Also, unlike a common law 
defense, a consumer could invoke a federal statute without the difficulty and expense 
of hiring a lawyer, thus increasing the availability of a remedy for consumers.  
Finally, the uniformity that could be achieved through a federal law would be hard to 
achieve in common law where cases are decided in different jurisdictions on a case 
by case basis.   
Such a statute prohibiting improvident extension of credit could be short in 
length and narrowly construed to apply only to situations involving credit card debt 
while still encompassing Vern Countryman’s original theory.  Legislators could look 
to the language of previously proposed legislation, such as that discussed in Part III.  
For example, improvident extension of credit could be defined as having four 
elements with the following language: 
If the court, as a matter of law, finds that a contract was based on 
improvident extension of credit, the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract.  An improvident extension of credit is defined as 
1. a contractual extension of credit  to a debtor, 
2. where it cannot be reasonably expected that the debtor can repay 
the debt according to the terms of the agreement, 
3. in view of the circumstances of the debtor at the time that credit 
was extended, 
4. as these circumstances were known to the creditor or would have 
been revealed to him on reasonable inquiry prior to credit 
extension. 
                                                                
255Id. 
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The legislators could then decide whether to codify improvident extension of 
credit solely as a defense or to draft it as a basis for affirmative relief as well.  As 
discussed in Part III, section E, Vern Countryman felt that improvident extension of 
credit should be a basis for affirmative relief because the improvident debt may have 
caused other damages to the debtor.256  For example, the debtor may have defaulted 
on other debts.257  For this very reason, Countryman believed that affirmative relief 
should also be extended to other creditors who were injured as a result of the 
improvident debt.258   
IX. CONCLUSION 
Improvident extension of credit must be recognized and stopped through the legal 
system; otherwise, society will also pay the price.259  George Ritzer and Robert 
Manning, prominent sociologists, assert that improvident extension of credit has both 
micro and macro effects on society.260  On the micro level, credit problems increase 
stress, create mental health problems, and cause family abuse because debt is the 
primary contributing factor to divorce and family problems.261  On the macro level, 
society must bear the burden of broken homes, dysfunctional families, and people 
needing mental health services.262  This leads to a need for more jails, more mental 
health services, more children and mothers needing shelter from abuse, more 
rehabilitative services, and more taxes to pay for it all.263  
Imagine once again that you are impoverished.  You are a single parent living in 
a small apartment with your kids.  You dropped out of high school, and you work a 
minimum wage job at the convenient store down the street.  Although the bank was 
aware of your financial situation, you were able to obtain a credit card.  You can 
barely pay the minimum balance each month, but you try to pay on time.  You use 
the card to buy food and clothing for your kids—you never buy new clothes for 
yourself.  You diligently pay your bill every month, but your car breaks down, 
absorbing the funds necessary to make your minimum payment.  The fees that you 
are charged put you over your credit limit, and you are charged more penalty fees.  
Now you are in a hole that you cannot possibly dig yourself out of.  That is all it 
takes.   
Now the telephone calls and letters begin.  The fees cause the amount that you 
owe to increase exponentially.  You may even receive notice of lawsuits, 
repossession, or foreclosure, but you do not have a high school education and do not 
understand what they mean.  You notify the credit card company of your difficulties, 
but you continue to pay.  You are too proud to file for bankruptcy.  You work too 
                                                                
256Countryman, supra note 3, at 20. 
257Id.  
258Id. 
259Amador, supra note 77. 
260Id.  
261Id.  
262Id. 
263Lander, supra note 88, at 210. 
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hard for that.  But it is too late, and you are caught in a downward spiral.  You have 
become a statistic.  You have a significantly greater risk of increased stress, family 
violence, mental illness, divorce, and suicide.  You feel totally alone, and there is no 
one to protect you.   
It is time to protect those in our community who need protection the most.  
Creditors have a right to payment on credit that they honestly and fairly extend to 
customers.  However, when these creditors know of the financial difficulties of a 
consumer and extend credit for the sole purpose of profiting from the consumer’s 
misfortune, they must be stopped.  Judges and legislators alike must follow the lead 
of Judge Triozzi in Discover Bank.  Judges must recognize the plight of the 
impoverished and create common law recognizing improvident extension of credit 
until the time when statutory law can be passed to put an end to the problem of 
improvident extension of credit. 
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